Traditional Knowledge, Intellectual Property, and Indigenous Culture: An Introduction by Yu, Peter K.
Texas A&M University School of Law
Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
2003
Traditional Knowledge, Intellectual Property, and
Indigenous Culture: An Introduction
Peter K. Yu
peter_yu@msn.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Cultural Heritage Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peter K. Yu, Traditional Knowledge, Intellectual Property, and Indigenous Culture: An Introduction, 11 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 239
(2003).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/558
SYMPOSIUM
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, AND INDIGENOUS CULTURE
AN INTRODUCTION
Peter K. Yu*
Human communities have always generated, refined and
passed on knowledge from generation to generation. Such "tradi-
tional" knowledge" [sic] is often an important part of their cul-
tural identities. Traditional knowledge has played, and still plays,
a vital role in the daily lives of the vast majority of people. Tradi-
tional knowledge is essential to the food security and health of
millions of people in the developing world. In many countries,
traditional medicines provide the only affordable treatment avail-
able to poor people. In developing countries, up to 80% of the
population depend on traditional medicines to help meet their
healthcare needs. In addition, knowledge of the healing proper-
ties of plants has been the source of many modern medicines.'
In recent years, the misappropriation of folklore, traditional
knowledge, and indigenous practices has become an increasingly
important issue in global politics.2 In September 2000, the World
Copyright © 2003 Peter K. Yu. All rights reserved.
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1 COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 73 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
2 For discussions of the interplay of intellectual property and traditional knowledge,
see generally Rosemary J. Coombe, The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples' and Commu-
nity Traditional Knowledge in International Law, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 275 (2001); David
R. Downes, How Intellectual Property Could Be a Tool to Protect Traditional Knowledge,
25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 253 (2000); Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indige-
nous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1997); Paul Kuruk,
Protecting Folklore Under Modern Intellectual Property Regimes: A Reappraisal of the Ten-
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Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) established the Inter-
governmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Re-
sources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, which provides a
forum for governments to discuss intellectual property matters
concerning the access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing and
the protection of traditional knowledge, innovations and creativity,
and expressions of folklore.3 Similar issues have been raised and
discussed within the framework of the Convention on Biological
Diversity4 and by such international intergovernmental organiza-
tions as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), and the World Health Organization (WHO). Most
recently, in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, members of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) called for the Council for
TRIPS "to examine . . . the relationship between the TRIPS
Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity [and] the
protection of traditional knowledge and folklore."5
Despite the limited attention it has received (until lately), the
debate over the protection of folklore, traditional knowledge, and
indigenous practices impacts on a wide variety of policy areas, in-
cluding agricultural productivity, biological diversity, cultural patri-
mony, food security, environmental sustainability, business ethics,
global competition, human rights, international trade, public
health, scientific research, sustainable development, and wealth
distribution. This debate becomes even more important in light of
growing dissatisfaction with the international trading system
sions Between Individual and Communal Rights in Africa and the United States, 48 AM. U.
L. REV. 769 (1999); Doris Estelle Long, The Impact of Foreign Investment on Indigenous
Culture: An Intellectual Property Perspective, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 229 (1998);
Srividhya Ragavan, Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 2 MinN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1
(2001); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the Scientific
and Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities, 17 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 919
(1996). See also Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Cultural Products, 81 B.U. L. REV.
793 (2001) (discussing the tension between group authorship and the current intellectual
property system).
3 The website of the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property
and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore is available at http://www.
wipo.int/globalissues/igc/index.html.
4 Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992).
5 Ministerial Declaration 19, WTO Document No. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 14,
2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/min0l-e/mindecl-e.doc.
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among less developed countries and of the recent anti-globaliza-
tion protests in Seattle, Washington, Prague, Quebec, and Genoa.6
On February 21-22, 2002, the Cardozo Intellectual Property
Law Program brought together leading academics, economists, in-
tellectual property lawyers, government officials, and representa-
tives of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations to
explore the role of intellectual property in protecting folklore,
traditional knowledge, genetic resources, and indigenous practices.
Among the issues addressed include: How to define folklore and
traditional knowledge? Should traditional knowledge and indige-
nous creations be protected under the existing intellectual property
and cultural property regimes? What are the implications of pro-
tecting folklore for art and museums? How can policymakers bal-
ance the protection of traditional innovations and genetic
resources of indigenous peoples against the need for those materi-
als in genomic research and in the development of pharmaceuti-
cals, nutriceuticals, and bio-engineered products? Should the
international community develop a global regulatory regime or
should it strive for diverse protection that is consistent with the
local conditions of each individual country? How can governments
effectively negotiate traditional knowledge in the domestic and in-
ternational fora?
So far, governments and intergovernmental organizations
have been focusing their energies, resources, and attention on un-
derstanding the issue. However, once they have acquired a deeper
understanding of, and greater practical experience on, this issue,
they might begin to develop international norms that seek to pro-
mote, protect, and preserve folklore, traditional knowledge, ge-
netic resources, and indigenous practices. In light of such
6 See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DIscoNTENTs (2002)
(discussing the increasing dissatisfaction over such international bodies as the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization). See also Frederick
M. Abbott, TRIPS in Seattle: The Not-So-Surprising Failure and the Future of the TRIPS
Agenda, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L LAW 165 (2000) (discussing the implications of the failed
Seattle Ministerial Conference for the future of the TRIPs Agreement); David A. Gantz,
Failed Efforts to Initiate the "Millennium Round" in Seattle: Lessons for Future Global
Trade Negotiations, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 349 (2000) (discussing the implications of
the failed Seattle Ministerial Conference for future global trade negotiations); Clyde Sum-
mers, The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Rights, and Societal Values, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 61 (2001) (arguing that the failed Seattle Ministerial Conference was the eruption
of long suppressed issues); Susan Tiefenbrun, Free Trade and Protectionism: The Semiotics
of Seattle, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 257 (2000) (offering a proposal for reconciling the
concerns of the protestors in Seattle with the purposes and procedures of the WTO).
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development, this introduction discusses four issues that are sel-
dom addressed by commentators.
First, the outcome of the negotiation process often depends on
the forum in which the parties conduct their negotiation.7 Indeed,
the international intergovernmental body that is responsible for or-
ganizing the treaty conference-be it FAO, UNCTAD, UNESCO,
WHO, WIPO, or WTO-has a strong ability to shape the terms of
the treaty, including its definitions, the scope of protection, the
remedies, and the enforcement mechanism.8 Even if we assumed
all the parties and issues involved were to be identical, a treaty
negotiated under the WTO regime would be very different from
one sponsored by WIPO.
Thus, if governments want to extend the protection of tradi-
tional knowledge beyond the intellectual property field-and per-
haps into the international trade arena-a WIPO-sponsored treaty
will be highly unsatisfactory. Likewise, if governments want to cre-
ate protection gradually and to limit initial protection to specific
intellectual property items, negotiating the treaty in the WTO
might not be ideal, as it might invite further complication of this
already very difficult issue by allowing governments to link intel-
lectual property to other trade-related items-or even to reopen
discussions concerning other aspects of the WTO Agreements, in-
cluding the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs). 9
As a result, policymakers have to be very careful in selecting
the forum in which they conduct their negotiation. Given the di-
verse array of issues involved in the protection of folklore, tradi-
7 See generally MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION
AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1998); SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND
IDEAS: NORTH-SouTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST (1998); SU-
SAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003); Symposium, World Trade, Intellectual Property, and the Global
Elites: Intellectual Property Lawmaking in the New Millennium, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1 (2002).
8 See INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 189 (Anthony D'Amato & Do-
ris Estelle Long eds., 1996) (stating that "[o]ften the treaty that emerges from a multilat-
eral treaty conference is noticeably shaped by the organization that provided the forum for
the conference"); see also INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY
57-60 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the negotiation of intellectual
property treaties).
9 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994)
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tional knowledge, and indigenous practices, it would be very
unlikely that a single international intergovernmental organization
can shape, or even dominate, the discussions. As the U.K.-based
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights noted in its recent
report:
It is essential that all of the agencies considering the issue work
together to avoid unnecessary duplication and to ensure that the
debate includes as many different views as possible. . . . We
believe .. .that no single body is likely to have the capacity,
expertise or resources to handle all aspects of traditional knowl-
edge. Indeed it is our view that a multiplicity of measures, only
some of them IP-related, will be necessary to protect, preserve
and promote traditional knowledge.1"
Second, the success of the negotiation process often depends
on the mindsets of the negotiators. In particular, it depends on
whether the negotiators believe they are playing a zero-sum game
or a nonzero-sum game. In game theory terms, a zero-sum game is
a game in which a player's gain must result in another player's loss.
By contrast, in a nonzero-sum game, a player's gain will not neces-
sarily result in another player's loss. Thus, negotiators having a
zero-sum mindset will be more likely to split the difference through
accommodation and compromises, whereas those having a
nonzero-sum mindset will be more likely to create forward-looking
solutions that provide mutual benefits to all the parties involved
while at the same time preserving the hard-earned relationships
among all the negotiating parties.11
Third, as conflict resolution scholars and cognitive psycholo-
gists have discussed in depth, policymakers face various psycholog-
ical barriers during the negotiation process, and these barriers can
undermine their ability in making rational decisions. 12 For exam-
ple, loss aversion is the tendency for decisionmakers to attach more
weight to prospective losses than to prospective gains of an equal
10 COMMISSION ON INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 78.
11 See generally Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach to Resolving Global
Intellectual Property Disputes: What We Can Learn from Mediators, Business Strategists,
and International Relations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569 (2002).
12 See, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CRE-
ATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 156-72 (2000) (discussing psychological and cultural
barriers); Robert A. Baruch Bush, "What Do We Need a Mediator for?": Mediation's
"Value-Added" for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 9-12 (1996) (discussing
cognitive barriers).
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value. 13 Policymakers who succumb to loss aversion might be more
receptive to proposals that protect traditional knowledge if they
focus on the potential benefits, rather than the potential costs, of
those proposals.
Another example is reactive devaluation-the tendency for
parties to devalue proposals offered by their adversaries even
though they will accept identical proposals put forward by their
allies or by neutral parties.' 4 Thus, if less developed countries per-
ceive developed countries as their adversaries, they will tend to un-
dervalue whatever proposals developed countries offer. By the
same token, if developed countries perceive less developed coun-
tries as their adversaries, and consider the traditional knowledge
debate an unjustified enlargement of the development agenda,
they also will undervalue whatever proposals less developed coun-
tries offer.
Finally, as many scholars and indigenous rights activists have
pointed out, the negotiation concerning the protection of tradi-
tional knowledge was significantly hampered by the lack of partici-
pation by the indigenous community. As Professor Rosemary
Coombe reminded us:
Although indigenous peoples are now recognized as key actors
in this global dialogue, it will need to be expanded to encompass
a wider range of principles and priorities, which will eventually
encompass political commitments to indigenous peoples' rights
of self-determination. Only when indigenous peoples are full
partners in this dialogue, with full juridical standing and only
when the their cultural world views, customary laws, and ecolog-
ical practices are recognized as fundamental contributions to
resolving local social justice concerns will we be engaged in any-
thing we can genuinely call a dialogue. 5
There is no doubt that policymakers should involve indigenous
peoples in the global dialogue. However, they should not ignore
the fact that many members of the traditional community remain
reluctant to participate in the negotiation process, partly due to
their concern about further abuse, misappropriation, and exploita-
tion of their arts and crafts and partly due to the secretive nature of
13 See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 161-64 (discussing loss aversion).
14 See id. at 165-66 (discussing reactive devaluation).
15 Coombe, supra note 2, at 284-85.
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some of the indigenous creations and practices, such as sacred sym-
bols and religious rituals. 16
In fact, policymakers have to be vigilant and constantly evalu-
ate whether the negotiation process contains any systematic bias or
barrier that makes participation difficult. After all, folklore, tradi-
tional knowledge, and indigenous practices were developed and
passed on from generations to generations through an oral tradi-
tion or by imitation. These materials do not fit well into the West-
ern worldview, the capitalist philosophy, and the contemporary
notion of individual authorship, all of which underlie the develop-
ment of the current international intellectual property regime. 17
In sum, the choice of forum, the mindsets of the negotiators,
the extent and impact of cognitive barriers on the policymakers,
and the participation of the indigenous community in the negotia-
tion process will play major roles in determining whether govern-
ments can create a mutually beneficial solution, whether they can
promote biological and cultural diversity, and whether they can es-
tablish a harmonized regime that effectively protects folklore,
traditional knowledge, and indigenous practices.
16 See, e.g., Farley, supra note 2, at 5 (discussing how some aboriginal designs are so
sacred that "they are viewed only during certain ceremonies, and only by those who have
attained the requisite level of initiation"); John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in
Cultural Property, 77 CAL. L. REV. 339, 356 (1989) (noting that some cultural objects "are
secret in nature, intended to be seen only by a restricted group of people at particular
times or exposed only in a specific place"); Scafidi, supra note 2, at 829-30 (discussing how
a newspaper photographer "violated and upset the Pueblo's balance of life" by taking pho-
tographs of a ceremonial dance while flying at low altitude over the Pueblo of Santo
Domingo).
17 As the Bellagio Declaration stated:
Contemporary intellectual property law is constructed around the notion of the
author, the individual, solitary and original creator, and it is for this figure that
its protections are reserved. Those who do not fit this model-custodians of
tribal culture and medical knowledge, collectives practicing traditional artistic
and music forms, or peasant cultivators of valuable seed varieties, for exam-
ple-are denied intellectual property protection.
Bellagio Declaration, reprinted in JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE & SPLEENS: LAW
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF INFORMATION SocIETY 192, 193 (1996):
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